中国为何投票支持制裁朝鲜

China this month moved to implement the sanctions on North Korea passed unanimously by the UN Security Council following Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests. Beijing said it will cut off imports of North Korean coal, iron ore and seafood in three weeks. The sanctions aim to cut North Korea’s $3bn in annual exports by a third. If universally implemented, they could have massive repercussions for the country’s economy.

中国已于本月15日起开始执行联合国安理会(UN Security Council)在朝鲜多次试射导弹后一致通过的制裁决议。中国当时表示，政策缓冲期为3周，之后将不再为进口自朝鲜的煤、铁矿石、水海产品办理进口手续。这轮制裁旨在将朝鲜30亿美元年度出口额削减三分之一。如果制裁得到全面执行，可能会对朝鲜经济造成强烈影响。

Shortly after voting in favour of the new hard-hitting measures, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said: “Given China’s traditional economic ties with North Korea, China more than anyone will pay a price for implementing the resolution.”

在投票支持新的强硬制裁措施后不久，中国外交部长王毅表示：“鉴于中国同朝鲜的传统经济联系，执行决议、付出代价的主要是中方。”

He added: “In order to maintain the international nuclear non-proliferation system and regional peace and stability, China will, as always, enforce the full content of relevant resolutions in a comprehensive and strict manner.”

他补充称：“为了维护国际核不扩散体系，为了维护地区的和平稳定，中方将一如继往全面、严格执行好有关决议的所有内容。”

The statement rings hollow, given how little North Korea matters economically to Beijing.

考虑到朝鲜在经济上对中国的意义微乎其微，这份声明听上去很空洞。

Given the high stakes involved in the current round of sanctions, and how little is known about China’s economic ties to North Korea, it is worth considering just how insignificant the reclusive state is to China’s economy.

鉴于当前一轮制裁关系之重大以及外界对中国与朝鲜经济联系的了解之少，我们有必要考虑这个“隐士王国”对于中国经济到底有多不重要。

While China’s economic engagement with North Korea has grown at breakneck speed in recent years — despite the sanctions imposed on Pyongyang — it makes up only a minimal share of Chinese international trade. In fact, while China traded with North Korea to the tune of about $5.29bn in 2015, its total trade volume that year was $3.64tn. In other words, trade with North Korea makes up just over 0.1 per cent of China’s bilateral trade.

尽管朝鲜受到制裁，中国与朝鲜的经济接触近年来仍飞速发展。但迄今为止，朝鲜在中国对外贸易中所占比例还是微乎其微。实际上，尽管2015年中国同朝鲜进出口总额达到52.9亿美元左右，但同年中国进出口总额高达3.64万亿美元。换句话说，中国同朝鲜进出口总额仅占中国进出口总额的0.1%多一点。

China’s foreign investment in the hermit kingdom paints the same picture. At the end of 2015, China’s outward investment stock passed the $1tn mark for the first time. How much of China’s investment is in North Korea? That same year, the total figure was $625m. Therefore, in 2015, about 0.06 per cent of officially reported Chinese foreign assets were invested in North Korea. Much of China’s outward investment flows through offshore financial centers, and is therefore difficult to track, but these figures speak for themselves.

中国对这个“隐士王国”的投资也呈现类似的情况。2015年末，中国对外直接投资存量首次超过万亿美元大关。中国对朝鲜直接投资存量有多少呢？同一年，这个数字为6.25亿美元。因此，2015年中国官方对外直接投资存量有约0.06%为对朝鲜直接投资存量。中国的大量对外投资通过离岸金融中心流出，因此很难追踪，但这些数据已经很说明问题了。

From the North Korean perspective the situation is quite different. China’s economic engagement has long represented Pyongyang’s lifeline. In 2015, more than 80 per cent of North Korea’s exports, largely coal, were destined for China. Its import basket is even more dependent on staying in Beijing’s good graces: more than 85 per cent of North Korea’s imports originate in China. Therefore, if Beijing imposes a chokehold on North Korea’s economy as agreed in the newest basket of sanctions, the effects on its economy will be devastating.

从朝鲜的角度来看，情况则完全不同。长期以来，与中国的经济接触一直是朝鲜赖以维生的经济来源。2015年，朝鲜逾80%的出口（主要是煤）流向中国。朝鲜的进口更依赖于中国把它当自己人：朝鲜逾85%的进口来自中国。因此，如果中国像最新一轮制裁要求的那样，掐住朝鲜经济的喉咙，对朝鲜经济的影响将是毁灭性的。

The Kim dynasty has proven to be remarkably resistant to sanctions. It is unlikely that the lifestyle of Kim Jong Un and his closest allies would change dramatically because of a deteriorating economic situation; the suffering would simply be passed down to ordinary North Koreans. That said, the sanctions will undoubtedly apply some pressure on the regime, and reduce the funds at its disposal for missile testing.

事实证明，金氏王朝明显对制裁免疫。金正恩(Kim Jong Un)及其密友的生活方式不太可能因为经济局势恶化而发生明显变化；受苦的只会是朝鲜普通民众。但即便如此，制裁无疑会对金正恩政权产生一些压力，并减少其可用于导弹试验的资金。

The imbalance in Chinese-North Korean economic relations is staggering. Beijing could virtually wipe out North Korea’s international trade and feel barely a sting in the process. Therefore, as Beijing decides whether and how to implement the sanctions on its north-east neighbour, economic considerations will hardly be part of its calculus.

中朝经济关系极度失衡。中国实际上能够把朝鲜的国际贸易化为乌有，同时自己只受微乎其微的影响。因此，在中国政府决定是否以及如何对这个东北部邻国实施制裁的时候，经济因素将几乎不在其考量之内。

On the other hand, the situation on the Korean Peninsula matters a great deal for Beijing in strategic terms. China has two key strategic concerns when it comes to the Korean Peninsula or, more specifically, the potential for a sudden downfall of the Kim dynasty. First, if the North Korean state collapsed overnight, up to 25m refugees would potentially pour into China’s borders. Second, if the Kim regime ceased to exist, a reunification like that experienced by Germany in 1990 would leave Beijing sharing a land border with a key US ally.

另一方面，朝鲜半岛局势在战略上对中国非常重要。就朝鲜半岛，或者更具体地说，就金氏王朝突然倒台的可能性来说，中国有两点关键的战略关切。第一，如果朝鲜政权一夜之间崩溃，至多2500万难民就可能涌入中国边境。第二，如果金氏政权倒台、朝鲜半岛出现像德国在1990年经历的那种统一，中国就会与一个美国关键盟友在陆地上接壤。

Mr. Wang’s statement is designed to portray China’s decision in a self-sacrificing light. Yet the idea that China’s business and economic interests would be seriously hurt by sanctions against Pyongyang does not hold up to scrutiny.

王毅的声明旨在将中国的决定描述为一种自我牺牲的举动。然而，中国商业和经济利益将因制裁朝鲜而严重受损的观点经不起推敲。

China’s policy towards North Korea has and continues to be based on the strategic interest of maintaining the status quo in North Korea to avoid a refugee crisis or an encroachment by US allies. The sanctions vote was cast with the expectation that it poses minimal risk to the survival of the Kim regime, and the certainty that its effects on China’s economy will be negligible.

无论过去、现在还是将来，中国对朝政策始终基于其战略利益，即维持朝鲜现状以避免难民危机或者遭受美国盟友围困。他们之所以投票支持制裁，是预计这种制裁对金氏政权生存的威胁微乎其微，对中国经济的影响肯定也将是可以忽略不计的。