关注社会:财政紧缩不宜"一刀切"

The policies of fiscal austerity now being pursued throughout Europe have come under their strongest attack yet. Double-dip recession is eroding voters’ confidence that belt-tightening is the best way to recover prosperity. Elections in France and political upheavals elsewhere are tilting the balance of opinion among policy makers away from unwavering commitments to deficit cuts. More than ever, clarity is needed about where and which kind of austerity is needed.

整个欧洲现在推行的财政紧缩政策面临着迄今最为强大的攻击。双底衰退正在侵蚀选民的信心，使他们不再相信勒紧腰带是恢复繁荣的最佳方式。法国的大选和其它国家的政治动荡，正使某些政策制定者本来坚定的减赤承诺出现动摇。对于哪些领域需要紧缩以及需要哪种紧缩，人们迫切需要清晰度。

Many forces buffet the world’s economies, and economic policies must be correspondingly nuanced. Simple-minded approaches to deficit-cutting will not do, and no single austerity policy is right for all countries. This is why the Financial Times has consistently given qualified support to the British government’s fiscal strategy while criticising the excessive zeal for deficit-cutting in some eurozone states and in the US policy debate.

很多因素在打击全球经济，因此经济政策必须相应圆滑。简单化的减赤是不够的，没有一种紧缩政策适合所有国家。这就是为什么英国《金融时报》一直对英国政府的财政战略表示有所保留的支持，同时批评一些欧元区国家（以及美国的政策辩论中）对减赤的过分热情。

Some commentators – many of them American, such as the economist Paul Krugman – condemn Europe’s fiscal consolidation strategies indiscriminately. There is no doubt that the direct effect of tightening fiscal balances is contractionary. But quite apart from the fact that long-term growth requires sound public finances, a lax fiscal policy also has two negative effects on short-term growth.

一些评论人士——其中很多是美国人，例如经济学家保罗?克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)——不分青红皂白地抨击欧洲的财政整固战略。毫无疑问，收紧财政平衡的直接影响是紧缩性的。然而，除了长期增长需要稳健的公共财政这个事实以外，宽松的财政政策对短期增长还有两种负面影响。

One is the risk of self-fulfilling panics in bond markets, with the crippling effect on both the public and the private sector that we see in affected countries. The other, more slow-burning but just as corrosive of growth, is that sustained large deficits and rapidly mounting debt can chill the animal spirits of business. Any good done by deficit spending can be lost to retrenchment by private employers.

首先是债市出现自我实现的恐慌的风险，这对公共和私营部门都会造成严重影响，我们在一些受影响的国家已看到这种影响。另一种负面影响的作用更加缓慢，但同样损害增长，那就是持续的巨额赤字和迅速增多的债务可能抑制企业的“动物精神”。赤字支出带来的任何好处，都可能被私营企业的紧缩所抵消。

Economic research can tell us something about the direct effect of fiscal stimuli on growth. It has less to say about the consequences for bond-market psychology – self-reinforcing and thus inherently unpredictable – or business confidence. What is certain is that whether the negative effects will outweigh a fiscal boost to growth varies from country to country.

经济研究能够告诉我们一些关于财政刺激对于增长的直接影响的事情。但对于债市心理（自我强化因而在本质上不可预测）或企业信心遭受的后果，就没有那么多启示了。可以肯定的是，对于这些负面影响会否压倒旨在促进增长的财政刺激，要看各国的国情而定。

In the US, the case for fiscal stimulus is strong. In a relatively closed economy government spending lifts domestic demand without much leakage. The $10tn Treasury market is also so big that it is largely a captive one. It is virtually impossible for investors to abandon it, as their equanimity towards last summer’s downgrade showed. An accommodating central bank helps. Similar considerations apply to Japan, if to a lesser degree.

在美国，财政刺激的理由很有说服力。在一个相对封闭的经济中，政府支出能够提振内需，而不致大量渗漏。10万亿美元的美国国债市场规模巨大，在很大程度上是一个支配性的市场。投资者几乎不可能抛弃它，就像去年夏天美国国债被降级而投资者表现镇定所显示的那样。央行的配合也有帮助。类似的考量也适用于日本，即便程度较小。

In contrast, small and middling countries, including all European states, face a different trade-off. They would only enjoy a muted demand stimulus from unilateral fiscal relaxation; so enmeshed are they in international trade, much of the effect would seep across their borders. Size also makes bond investors a greater flight risk. Even the Italian sovereign bond market – well supported by domestic investors and the world’s third-largest – is, it turns out, easy to exit en masse.

与美日形成反差的是，中小国家（包括所有欧洲国家）面临着不同的取舍。单边财政放松只会带来温和的需求刺激；由于它们深度参与国际贸易，因此很多刺激效果将渗漏到国界之外。此外，它们的规模意味着债券投资者逃离的风险更大。事实证明，就连意大利主权债券市场（受到国内投资者的大力支持，并且是全球第三大国债市场）也很容易大举撤出。

This does not justify the eurozone’s official ideology of universal austerity. Many euro countries have ample fiscal space and should wield deficit spending as a tool to counter slow growth or recession. Only those with very large deficits, huge debt burdens or both have no choice but to cut, and cut hard. That includes the three states with rescue programmes, but not Spain.

这说明欧元区普遍紧缩的官方理念是不合理的。很多欧元区国家拥有充足的财政空间，应当将赤字开支当作一种工具，以遏制缓慢增长或衰退。只有那些拥有巨额赤字、背负沉重债务负担（或二者兼有）的国家才没有选择，只能削减赤字，而且要大力削减。这包括3个正在实施纾困计划的国家，但不包括西班牙。

In Britain, fiscal laxity would do more harm than good (though how the cuts fall could be improved). Its structural deficit is exceeded only by the US, Japan and Ireland among advanced countries. Investors who take fright can easily shift money abroad. Critics of the ruling coalition’s policy say low gilt yields mean investors want the government to borrow more. But this treats markets’ welcome of a multiyear deficit reduction plan as if it were a prayer for the high deficit to be maintained.

在英国，财政放松弊大于利（尽管在如何削减的问题上存在改进空间）。在发达国家中，英国的结构性赤字仅次于美国、日本和爱尔兰。恐慌的投资者可以轻易把资金转移到海外。对英国联合政府的政策提出批评的人士表示，英国国债的低收益率意味着，投资者希望政府借贷更多。但这话就像把市场对多年减赤计划的欢迎，看成是在祈祷保持高水平赤字。

They also say the Bank of England, unlike the European Central Bank, can be trusted to keep gilt yields low. But the BoE is independent. It would take a true catastrophe for it to be willing to buy as many gilts as it takes to guarantee the government low borrowing costs. Even if it did fill the shoes of panicking gilt investors, such a scenario would hardly contain funding costs for UK banks abroad or make British businesses eager to invest and employ.

批评人士还表示，与欧洲央行(ECB)不同，人们可以相信英国央行(Bank of England)会让英国国债收益率维持低位。但英国央行是独立的。要让英国央行愿意为了压低政府借款成本而无止境地购买英国国债，那就需要发生一场真正的大灾难。即便它果真代替了恐慌的英国国债投资者，这种情景也很难抑制英国各银行在海外的融资成本，也不会让英国企业积极投资和招聘。

Only globally co-ordinated fiscal policy can improve the trade-off faced by small and middling economies. A true growth compact – which should be global, not just European – could let risky states run a slightly less tight ship if safe states bore the brunt of boosting demand. This would take greater leadership than we have yet seen.

只有经过全球协调的财政政策，才能改善中小经济体面对的取舍权衡。一项真正的增长契约——它应当是全球性的，而不仅仅是欧洲范围的——可以让有风险的国家多一点回旋空间，而让稳健的国家承担提振需求的主要负担。这将需要比我们迄今见到的更大的领导力。译者:梁艳裳