基建项目 中日角力泰国铁路项目

The strategic rivalry between Japan and China in Asia is finding expression not only in territorial disputes in the east China sea but also in plans for railways to criss-cross Thailand and eventually link the country to a wider Indochina rail network.

日本与中国在亚洲的战略竞争不只表现在双方在东中国海的领土争端上，也表现在双方对泰国铁路项目的争夺上。这些项目计划修建交叉贯穿泰国的铁路线，最终将泰国与更广阔的印度支那铁路网连接起来。

Both lines will serve primarily as freight transport systems. The planned Chinese-backed railway will run north-south from Thailand’s main deep seaport in Rayong to the Laos border at Nong Khai, with a separate spur that connects to Bangkok.

这两条铁路线都将主要用于货运。拟议中由中国出资建设的铁路线将自南向北，从泰国在罗勇(Rayong)的主要深水港通至泰国和老挝边境线上的廊开(Nong Khai)，并有一条支线连接到曼谷。

The proposed Japanese one would cross Thailand east to west, connecting Bangkok to the border towns nearest to Siem Reap, Cambodia, and Dawei, Myanmar. Dawei is the planned site of a major industrial zone and deep seaport backed by the Japanese, Thai and Myanmar governments.

拟议中由日本出资建设的铁路线将是东西走向的，将曼谷与距柬埔寨暹粒(Siem Reap)和缅甸土瓦(Dawei)最近的泰国边境城镇连接起来。土瓦是规划中的主要工业区和深水港的所在地，该计划得到日本、泰国和缅甸三国政府的支持。

In addition to these two rail projects, China and Japan have each also expressed interest in developing additional train lines, including high-speed passenger railways.

除了上述两个铁路项目以外，中日两国都表达出对建设其他铁路线的兴趣，包括客运高速铁路线。

The projects reflect more than the desperate need for modern long-distance trains in Thailand. China and Japan are openly vying for economic influence in South-east Asia, though for different sets of reasons.

这些项目不仅反映出泰国亟需现代化长途铁路线，也反映出中日正在东南亚公开争夺经济影响力，尽管这两个国家是出于不同的原因。

As its economy continues to expand, China is accelerating efforts to increase its economic influence in Southeast Asia. The proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank stands as perhaps the most ambitious example, but China is also ramping up its use of official development assistance (ODA) projects, historically the domain of wealthy developed countries.

随着中国经济不断增长，中国加快了在东南亚扩大其经济影响力的步伐。拟议中的亚洲基础设施投资银行(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)，或许就是最能体现中国雄心抱负的一个例子。但中国还在扩大对官方发展援助(ODA)项目的使用，这类项目过去一直是富裕发达国家的专属领域。

China has also been eager to support Thailand’s new military government, which came to power with the May 22 coup last year. In addition to the railway development, China has agreed to government-to-government (G2G) purchases of rice and rubber, both commodities that have suffered oversupply and weak prices in the last year. These and other overtures to Thailand are particularly strategic while the suspension of democracy under the junta has strained relations with the US.

中国还迫切想要支持去年5月22日通过政变上台的泰国新一届军政府。除了铁路建设以外，中国还与泰国达成了一项政府间采购协议，购入泰国的大米和橡胶。去年，这两种大宗商品遭遇了供应过剩和价格疲软。在泰国军政府中止实行民主制、导致泰国与美国关系趋于紧张之际，中国的上述及其他向泰国示好的举措格外具有战略意义。

Japan, meanwhile, seeks to maintain its long-established economic influence in Southeast Asia. The country remains the leading source of foreign direct investment in the 10-members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) and increasingly relies on the region as a manufacturing base.

日本则寻求维持其在东南亚地区确立已久的经济影响力。日本目前仍是东盟(Asean)十国的最大外商直接投资(FDI)来源国，同时日本也越来越依赖于作为制造基地的东南亚地区。

This is most true in Thailand, which serves as the most important hub for Japanese automobile, industrial, and consumer goods exports in Asia. Indeed, Japan has so much manufacturing in Thailand that in a very direct sense an investment in Thailand’s infrastructure is an investment in Japan’s industrial sector.

在泰国尤其如此。泰国现在是日本面向亚洲出口汽车、工业品和消费品的最重要枢纽。事实上，日本有大量制造工厂设在泰国，从这个意义上说，对泰国基础设施的投资就是对日本工业部门的投资。

The extent of Japan’s reliance on Thailand as its Southeast Asian manufacturing bulwark hit home in the aftermath of the 2011 floods that plunged Thai industry into a crisis and clobbered Japan’s supply chain.

日本依赖东南亚作为其重要的生产基地，其依赖程度之深在2011年令其深受其害。那一年发生了洪灾，导致泰国工业陷入危机，沉重打击了日本的供应链。

Unease over China’s emergence as the leading Asian economic and military force also means that Japan has a special interest in preserving economic soft power in Asean. The region’s shared border with China, coupled with Beijing’s strong existing ties with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, makes Indochina ripe for Chinese inroads into Japan’s regional influence.

中国崛起为亚洲最大的经济与军事强国引起了一些人的不安，这也意味着在东盟保有经济软实力对日本有着特殊的利益。东盟国家与中国有着共同的边界，再加上中国与柬埔寨、老挝和缅甸目前关系紧密，使得中国在印度支那侵蚀日本在该地区影响力的时机已经成熟。

Thailand is a potential winner here, assuming the railways are actually constructed. But in a country with a history of cancelled and abandoned infrastructure projects, it is too soon to assume that either project will move forward, or that they will be completed even if ground is broken. Sceptics will point to “Thai Stonehenge”, several kilometres of concrete pillars intended for an abandoned elevated train to Don Muang International Airport.

如果上述铁路线真的建成，泰国将成为赢家。但考虑到该国在历史上曾多次取消和放弃基建项目，现在就认定这两个项目中至少有一个项目会向前推进还为时过早，即使破土动工了，项目最终也未必会完工。怀疑论者会提到“泰国巨石阵”——这里指的是一些矗立的混凝土柱子，连绵数公里排开，原本是用来修建通往廊曼国际机场(Don Muang International Airport)的高架轨道线，后来项目被放弃了。

Every government since the 1990s has discussed replacing the country’s ancient rail system, but two decades later no significant progress has been made. The failure stands as a testament to dysfunctional politics: even with clear support from the public, business community, and no genuine resistance from opposition parties, no administration has succeeded in making such an obvious and beneficial investment.

自20世纪90年代以来，泰国历届政府都讨论过更换该国古老的铁路系统，但20年过去了，没有取得任何重大进展。这一失败成了该国政治失灵的证据：尽管得到公众和企业界的明确支持，而且反对党未有任何实质性抵制，但没有一届政府成功地作出了这样一项公认应当作出的、有益的投资。

Nonetheless, the current military leadership has shown an ability to get things done, giving the projects a greater chance of getting off the ground – especially when the railways reflect the wider geopolitical concerns of both regional heavyweights.

不过，泰国现在的军政府已展示出了把事情做好的能力，这使得上述铁路项目有更大的可能向前推进——特别是考虑到这些项目反映出了两个亚洲大国更大的地缘政治关切。