朝鲜发行新币失败将成历史转折点
朝鲜喜欢向世界展示一种强大的形象，但其国内却正在上演一场严重的经济危机。这场危机可能会产生深远的影响，将来历史学家回过头来看时，或许会将它视为一个重要的转折点。
North Korea likes to project an image of strength to the world. But back home, there is a serious economic crisis playing out that could have long-term repercussions. Historians may look back and see this as a tipping point.
危机始于去年11月，当时朝鲜政府向公众强制推出一场掠夺式的货币改革，家庭储蓄、商人和企业家的流动资金一扫而光。随着人们抛掉朝鲜圆、买入外币甚至是实物──不管什么，只要能够储值就行──朝鲜圆的币值不出所料地大幅下跌。一个月后，朝鲜政府又扩大了它对私人持有资金发起的战争，即禁止使用外国货币。
The crisis originated in November, when the government sprang upon the public a confiscatory currency reform that wiped out household saving and the working capital of traders and entrepreneurs. The value of the North Korean won predictably plunged as People abandoned it for foreign currencies and even physical goods-anything that could preserve value. The second shoe dropped a month later when the state extended its war on privately held capital, banning the use of foreign currencies.
政府的意图是恢复正统的共产主义。再往前溯，2009年8月，朝鲜领导人金正日的妹妹金敬姬(Kim Kyong Hui)在一篇电文中播发了这项政策，称赞中央计划经济相对于散漫市场的优越性。她甚至强烈批评在社会主义经济制度下给企业经理人更大自主权的想法。央行在改革开始后不久发布的声明更是说明，朝鲜当局的基本动机在于摧毁市场，强化国家的直接控制。
The government's intent was to reconstitute orthodox communism. Earlier in August, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's sister, Kim Kyong Hui, telegraphed the move in an essay extolling the superiority of central planning over the decentralized market-even trashing the notion of giving enterprise managers greater autonomy in the context of a socialist economy. The regime's basic motive-to crush the market and strengthen direct state control-was confirmed by central bank statements immediately after the reform.
这项政策被认为是迎接金正日第三个儿子、也是最小的儿子金正云在政坛上露面。货币改革引起了零星但非同寻常的抗议。政府做了退步，允许市场重新开放，并在今年2月份进行了史无前例的道歉。77岁的技术型官员朴南基在成为党的经济负责人时，据称还声言要结束“资本家的幻想”，但他成了货币改革失败的替罪羊，据称已被处决。
But the policy, which was supposed to constitute the political coming out of expected heir Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il's third and youngest son, unleashed extraordinary, though sporadic, protests. The government backtracked, allowed markets to reopen and in February issued an unprecedented apology. Park Nam Ki, a 77-year-old technocrat who upon becoming the Party's economics chief allegedly vowed to end the 'capitalist fantasy,' was scapegoated and reportedly executed.
事实或许证明，经济在撕开一道口子后就很难恢复。货币改革过后，大米、玉米和美元价格上涨了6,000%或以上。由于政府放宽了一些限制，物价已从最高水平回落，但相比改革前的水平仍然上涨了600%或以上──这还是货币供应收缩过后的情况。
Once broken, the economy may prove difficult to repair. Prices for goods such as rice, corn and the dollar rose 6,000% or more after the reform. And while prices have come down from their peak as the government has relaxed some of its strictures, they are currently still 600% or more above their prereform levels-in spite of the money-supply contraction.
联合国粮农组织(Food and Agriculture Organization)报告称，朝鲜粮食缺口在100万吨以上。由于统计方法上的缺陷，这一估计数字可能存在夸大的情况，但来自归来游客和难民网络的零散饥饿报告正在不断涌现。政府似乎是劝说合作社的农民接受了现金，来替代每年配给他们的粮食中的一半──然后通过货币改革，让这笔奖赏变得一文不值。农民们现在正在尽一切努力囤积粮食：联合国开发计划署(Development Program)报告称，收获后粮食损失达到了30%。农业经济已遭到严重破坏。但和20世纪90年代那场主要发生在城镇、可能造成100万人死亡的饥荒不同，据报告这次饥饿是发生在农村地区。
The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the country is more than one million metric tons short of grain. This estimate is likely exaggerated due to faulty methodology, but anecdotal reports of hunger are emerging from returning visitors and refugee networks. It appears the government persuaded farmers in cooperatives to accept cash in lieu of half of their annual in-kind grain allotment-then rendered the bonus worthless via the currency reform. Farmers are now hoarding grain however they can: The United Nations Development Program reports that post-harvest losses amount to 30%. The farm economy has been severely disrupted. But unlike the 1990s famine, which was largely an urban phenomenon and killed perhaps a million people, hunger is now reported in the countryside.
政府对上述情况已采取的应对措施也不让人放心。朴南基被处决后，他的职位由80多岁的老人Yun Gi Jeong接替。Yun Gi Jeong主要是作为朝鲜开国元首金日成的亲信而闻名。这位政治警察是从官僚系统晋升上来的，直接隶属于金正日用以掌管国家机器的国防委员会。这不是一个有信心或有能力的政府会做的事情。
The state's response to these developments has not been reassuring. After Mr. Park was executed, he was replaced by an octogenarian, Yun Gi Jeong, known primarily as a confidante of North Korea's founder, Kim Il Sung. The political police have been bureaucratically elevated and placed directly under the National Defense Commission, from where Kim Jong Il runs the state. This is not the behavior of a confident or competent government.
最近的诸种失误破坏性尤其巨大，因为它们都是朝鲜自己造成的，完全不符合朝鲜政府把所有困难归罪于外国敌对力量的说法。加州大学圣地亚哥分校(University of California San Diego)的哈格德(Stephan Haggard)2008年11月对300名朝鲜外逃者的调查发现，受调查者对外国新闻源的接触正越来越多，并且不愿意接受政府的解释，而认为造成他们窘迫生活的责任在于政府。货币改革的惨败将会加快这些趋势。
The recent missteps are particularly damaging because they are so obviously self-inflicted and nakedly incompatible with the regime's narrative that ascribes all the nation's challenges to hostile foreign forces. A survey of 300 North Korean refugees conducted in November 2008 by Stephan Haggard of the University of California San Diego found that respondents were increasingly accessing foreign sources of news and disinclined to accept the government's explanations, instead holding it responsible for their plight. The currency fiasco will accelerate these trends.
不过，普遍的觉醒甚至异见并不一定能把人们调动起来。上述调查还发现，人们依旧彼此孤立，往往害怕表露自己的这类看法，甚至是对朋友和家人也一样。不过，有一点可以部分说明为什么政府对市场如此痛恨：参与市场活动的人更有可能向其他人表达自己的不同意见。
Widespread disillusion, even dissent, does not guarantee mobilization, however. The same survey found that the population remains atomized and mostly fearful of communicating these views, even to friends and family. But the state can justify its hatred of the market in one respect: People participating in market activities are significantly more likely to communicate their dissent to their peers.
没有理由期望这种复兴正统共产主义的尝试会获得成功。不过，援助的涌入能让政府保持货架上货品充足、满足关键人群的需要，这会让政府的尝试变得更加容易。有传言说，金正日将于本月晚些时候访问中国，中国将从朝鲜获得重返六方会谈的承诺。六方会谈是关于朝鲜核计划的，目前已经陷入停顿。
There is no reason to expect that this attempt to revive orthodox communism will succeed. But an influx of aid, which would allow the state to keep goods on the shelves and satisfy key constituencies, would make it easier. It is rumored that Kim Jong Il will visit China later this month and that the Chinese will extract a commitment by the North Koreans to rejoin the stalled Six Party Talks over its nuclear program.
如果朝鲜真的同意重返六方会谈，那么经济上的不景气和从中美两国骗取更多援助的机会可能就是它改变主意的原因。中国实际上采取了韩国前政府实施的“阳光政策”，在美国政府内部，已经有人讨论再进行一次“谈判换食品”的交易，让朝鲜回到谈判桌前。
If North Korea does agree, economic distress and the opportunity to wheedle more aid out of China and the U.S. may explain this change of heart. China has effectively taken up the mantle of the previous South Korean government's 'sunshine policy,' and within the U.S. government there are already discussions of another 'food for talks' swap to bring the North Koreans back to the table.
朝鲜的倒退行径让经济遭受严重打击，不满情绪在公众间蔓延。不过，朝鲜缺乏能够把这种不满情绪引导到有益的政治行动上的公民社会机构。援助和压迫可能使政府可以在一段时间内追求落伍的共产主义，不过下一位领导人继承的将是一个最终无法维持的局面。
North Korea's retrograde moves are wrecking its economy and propagating discontent among the masses. But the country is bereft of civil society institutions capable of channeling that discontent into constructive political action. Aid and repression may permit the regime to pursue anachronistic communism for some time, but the next leader will inherit an ultimately untenable situation.
