中国应如何与市场对话 China needs to learn how to talk to markets

The Chinese leadership is discovering that financial markets have a tendency to punish governments for doing the right thing at the wrong time. And it is not the only one dealing with the repercussions. The consequences are being felt around the world.

中国领导层正在发现，金融市场往往会惩罚在错误时间做正确事情的政府。而中国并非唯一一个受其影响的国家。全世界都感受到了后果。

Just a few weeks ago, Beijing moved to make its exchange rate setting mechanism more flexible. This decision — which had been advocated to Chinese officials for years by economists and US governments — is an important step in the country’s multi-decade journey towards a truly market-based system. And, as such a large economy on the global stage, it is consistent with the country gradually assuming more of its multilateral economic governance responsibilities.

就在几周前，中国政府采取行动以使其汇率形成机制变得更加灵活。这一决定（经济学家们以及美国政府多年来一直主张中国官员这样做）是中国数十年来走向真正市场化机制进程中的重要一步。而且，作为全球舞台上如此巨大的经济体，中国这样做与逐步承担更多的多边经济治理责任相一致。

From many dimensions, this was a good policy step. The problem is that it was implemented at the wrong time.

从许多方面来说，这是一项不错的政策措施。但问题在于它是在错误的时间实施的。

Delayed and then announced in the context of mounting evidence that China is in the midst of a significant economic slowdown, it resulted in an immediate depreciation of the renminbi. As such, rather than being viewed as an important part of beneficial medium-term economic reform, it was deemed by many as China’s attempt to “steal” growth from other countries — thereby contributing to global financial instability as markets rushed to price in the probability of a larger deceleration of the global economy.

之前一直拖延、而后又在越来越多的证据表明中国经济正处于显著放缓时宣布这一决定，其结果是人民币随即贬值。如此一来，这一举措不但未被看作是有益的中期经济改革的重要部分，还被许多人视为中国试图从其他国家“窃取”增长——从而导致了全球金融不稳定，因为市场急于在价格中反映全球经济更大范围减速的可能性。

It only took a few days for disruptive markets to force the government to intervene in the foreign exchange market, rather than be less involved. As the global financial disorder persisted, it then felt obliged to supplement this with a series of monetary stimulus measures, including an interest-rate cut, lower reserve requirement and direct liquidity injections.

混乱的市场只用了几天时间就迫使中国政府干预外汇市场（而非更少地介入）。随着全球金融混乱持续不断，中国政府还感到有必要辅以一系列货币刺激措施——包括降息、降准以及直接注入流动性。

There is a risk that a similar phenomenon could play out following reports that the government may pare down its involvement in the stock market.

中国政府可能会减少干预股市的报道出现后，类似的一幕有可能还会上演。

Recognising that it cannot (and should not) be in the business of supporting overvalued stocks, there are reports that Beijing is considering moving away from its policy of large-scale market purchases. This is the right thing to do. But, once again, if the government is not careful, a step consistent with medium-term reform could well come at the wrong time; and, this time around, it is regrettably accompanied by the shaming of those raising doubts about current market valuations.

有报道称，在认识到自身无法（也不应该）支撑估值过高的股价之后，中国政府正在考虑退出大规模购股政策。这是正确的做法。但是，如果中国政府不谨慎行事的话，一项与中期改革一致的措施很有可能再次出现在错误的时间；而遗憾的是，这次还要伴随着那些对当前股市估值提出质疑人士的羞辱。

Markets in China and elsewhere are still in the process of trying to regain their footing after a week of unprecedented volatility. In such circumstances, market-savvy policymakers would allow the dust to settle further before doing something that could destabilise still-anxious investor sentiment.

经过一周空前的震荡后，中国及其他地区的股市仍处于努力重新站稳脚跟的阶段。在这种情况下，洞悉市场的政策制定者在采取一些可能让仍然焦虑的投资者情绪更加不稳定的措施前，应该继续等待尘埃落定。

This phenomenon, of taking the right policy step at the wrong time from a markets perspective, is not limited to China. The US Federal Reserve has experienced it several times, including when it triggered a “taper tantrum” in May-June 2013: the sudden announcement that it intended to ease — or taper — monetary stimulus that threw global markets in a dizzy for a few weeks, and that forced the Fed to talk back its statement.

这种现象——从市场的角度看，在错误时间采取正确的政策措施——并不只发生在中国。美联储(Fed)已经历过多次，包括在2013年5月至6月间引发的一场“缩减恐慌”(taper tantrum)：美联储突然宣布打算放缓（或缩减）货币刺激，引发全球市场几个周的动荡，并迫使美联储收回了自己的声明。

As it engages further on the road of economic liberalisation and broader market-based reforms, China will learn something that other countries have done so painfully, be it elsewhere in the emerging world (Brazil or South Korea, for example) or in the advanced world. It has no choice but to be a lot more sensitive to short-term market positioning, including the potential for sudden portfolio reversals that then risk spilling back on to the real economy and undermining the effectiveness of policies.

随着在经济自由化和更广泛市场化改革的道路上进一步深入，中国将学到一些其他国家——无论是其他新兴市场国家（如巴西和韩国）还是发达国家——已有过的惨痛教训。中国别无选择，只能对短期市场资源配置更加敏感，包括投资组合突然反转、随后风险蔓延至实体经济并削弱政策有效性的可能性。

Such sensitivity will need to be accompanied by much better communication, as well as more sophisticated management of market expectations (and this does not include the intimidation of sellers and the public shaming of financial journalists). Otherwise, the credibility of the Chinese government itself, including its history of admirable policymaking and vision, would be repeatedly tested by disgruntled and unstable financial markets; and, were this to materialise, the repercussions would inevitably be felt by financial markets in the rest of the world.

这样的敏感需要伴随更好的沟通，以及更成熟的市场预期管理（而这不包括对卖方的恐吓以及对财经记者的公开羞辱）。否则，中国政府自身的公信力——包括其令人钦佩的决策和愿景构想历史——将受到满腹牢骚的不稳定金融市场的反复考验；而如果真是这样的话，影响将不可避免地波及到世界其他地区的金融市场。

Mohamed is chief economic adviser to Allianz, chairman of President Barack Obama’s Global Development Council, and author of When Markets Collide

本文作者是安联集团(Allianz)首席经济顾问，并担任美国总统巴拉克攠巴马(Barack Obama)的全球发展委员会(Global Development Council)的主席，并著有《当市场发生冲撞》(When Markets Collide)一书。