印度尼西亚将为"吃老本"付出代价

Indonesia has often been described as the next India. With 250m people, it has a huge population of aspiring consumers. Like India, it is a democracy, albeit a far more recent convert. Like India, too, its solid record of growth has been propelled not by manufactured exports but by domestic demand. When the global financial crisis struck, both economies weathered the storm better than most.

印尼经常被描述为下一个印度。它有着2.5亿人口，憧憬美好生活的消费者人数巨大。与印度一样，它也是一个民主国家，尽管走上民主道路的时间短得多。同样地，其稳定的增长纪录不是出口制造业推动的，而是国内需求推动的。当全球金融危机袭来的时候，这两个经济体都比大多数国家更好地挺过了风暴。

Suddenly, however, the comparison with India does not sound so sweet. After India, Indonesia has been the Asian economy that has received most scrutiny from markets concerned about its current account deficit and reliance on capital inflows. More fundamentally, market pressure is raising awkward questions about the growth model of an Indonesian economy that has cruised along without laying the policy foundations for sustained development. Such doubts apply equally to a number of other emerging economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa that have floated on a tide of easy money and high commodity prices.

然而，突然之间，与印度相提并论听上去不再那么顺耳。继印度之后，印尼是受到市场最多关注的亚洲经济体，市场担忧其经常账户赤字和对资本流入的依赖。更为根本的是，市场压力正对印尼经济的增长模式提出一些棘手的问题；近年印尼经济借助一些有利条件蓬勃发展，但未能奠定持续发展的政策基础。亚洲、拉美、非洲的其他很多新兴经济体也有同样的问题，近年他们都在搭宽松货币和高大宗商品价格的顺风车。

The comparisons between India and Indonesia, the world’s second and fourth most populous nations, are many. Indonesia is now running a hefty trade deficit after years of surplus came to an abrupt end last year. The rapid deterioration since 2012 has largely been a result of weaker prices for commodities such as coal and palm oil, undermining the notion that Indonesia’s economy is not export-dependent.

世界第二和第四人口大国印度和印尼之间有很多可比之处。多年的贸易顺差在去年突然消失之后，印尼现在面对相当高的贸易赤字。2012年以来的快速恶化主要是由于煤炭和棕榈油等大宗商品价格的下降，这削弱了印尼不是出口依赖型经济体的说法。

India, in common with Indonesia, has not developed a sufficiently sophisticated manufacturing industry capable of generating big foreign exchange receipts or, just as important, jobs. Both countries share a supposed demographic dividend. Yet unless the economy can create enough employment, a young, restless population can be more of a curse than a benefit.

与印尼类似，印度没有发展起一个足够复杂的制造业带来大笔外汇收入或者同样重要的就业。两国在理论上都拥有“人口结构红利”，然而，除非一个经济体能够创造足够的就业，否则年轻而浮躁的人群可能在更大程度上是一种诅咒，而不是效益。

India is the more extreme case. Services account for most of its growth, commanding two-thirds of national output with just one-third of its workforce. (More than half the adult population are farmers.) Some of those services are exported via the country’s formidable technology industry. Still, its economy invites comparison with the fabled South Sea island whose model relies on everybody doing each other’s laundry. In the end, unless a country can make the things required by an aspiring middle-class economy – from iPads to power stations – it must earn the money to import them.

印度是一个更为极端的例子。服务占其增长的大部分，三分之一的劳动力贡献了全国产出的三分之二。（一半以上的成年人是农民。）其中一些服务是通过该国强大的技术行业出口的。但其经济模式仍让人联想起传说中的南海岛，依靠众人相互帮忙。最终而言，如果一个国家不能生产中产阶层经济所需的商品（从iPad到发电站），那么它就必须挣钱去进口。

Indonesia’s economy is less skewed to services, which account for 39 per cent of output against 47 per cent for industry. Still, few would argue that it has done enough to build up manufacturing capabilities commensurate with its potential. As in India, building factories has been made unnecessarily difficult by power and transport constraints, by the problems related to acquiring land, and by overly-complex regulations that facilitate bribe-taking.

印尼经济的服务业比重没那么高，服务占总产出的39%，而工业占比为47%。然而，几乎没有人认为这个国家的制造业实力与其潜力相称。与印度类似，电力和运输限制、与获得土地相关的问题，以及滋生受贿的过度复杂的监管，都给建造工厂带来了不必要的困难。

India at least boasts some world-class entrepreneurs in such areas as outsourcing and pharmaceuticals. Many of Indonesia’s most successful businessmen are rent-seekers whose political connections and entrenched monopolies allow them to build easy fortunes. Too many are content to ship out raw materials or sell foreign goods at home under licence. The lure of a quick buck often trumps notions of improving productive capacity or nation building.

在外包和制药业等领域，印度至少有一些世界级的企业家。印尼最成功的商人中，有很多人其实是寻租者，他们的政治人脉和固化的垄断地位，使得他们能够轻松积累财富。有太多人满足于出口原材料或者在国内特许销售外国产品。快速获得收益的诱惑，往往胜过了发展生产力或者国家建设的理念。

There are also political parallels. Both countries are staggering towards the end of their leader’s second term. Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s president, will have served 10 years apiece by the time each country holds general elections next year.

还有政治方面的可比性。两国现任领导都将结束第二任期。到明年大选的时候，印度总理曼莫汉•辛格(Manmohan Singh)和印尼总统苏西洛•班邦•尤多约诺(Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)都将已经主政十年。

Mr Singh was once hailed as the superman of Indian reform. In his second term, he has turned back into Clark Kent. There have been stop-start attempts to open up industries from retail to insurance. But foreign investors have not been convinced. They have been put off by red tape, shifting tax policy and regulations as unreliable as the electricity supply. Public fury at the corrupt nexus between businessmen and politicians has been commendable, but in the absence of strong leadership, the result has been paralysis.

辛格曾被誉为印度改革的超人。但在第二任期，他已变回了克拉克•肯特（Clark Kent，超人的常人形象——译者注）。近年印度有过一些开放国内行业（从零售业到保险业）的走走停停的尝试。但外国投资者并不买账。他们在官僚体制、变化无常的税收政策以及像供电那样不可靠的监管面前却步。公众对商人和政客之间腐败关系的愤怒值得肯定，但在没有强有力领导的情况下，结果便是瘫痪。

SBY, as Indonesia’s army general turned civilian leader is known, has also coasted in his second term. There has been very little structural reform or coherent industrial policy. He has been more preoccupied with cementing the political transition by keeping the country’s power brokers happy than with taking on vested interests for the sake of the nation.

作为从印尼军事将领转变为文职领导人的苏西诺，也在第二任期抱有求稳心态，没有推出什么结构性改革或者连贯的产业政策。他在更大程度上注重通过取悦权力掮客来巩固政治转型，而不是为了国家而对付既得利益。

Indonesia has pursued a radical decentralisation of power. This has brought certain advantages, but has also multiplied the regulatory layers and opportunities for corruption. One reform that its government did pass was to cut a fuel subsidy that had pushed the budget into deficit. While the price rise has had an inflationary impact, it is the right thing to do. Trying to help the poor through ill-targeted subsidies is another policy mistake Indonesia shares with India.

印尼实行了大刀阔斧的地方分权。这带来了一定的优势，但也导致监管层面倍增，产生腐败机会。印尼政府的确通过的一项改革是削减导致预算陷入赤字的燃油补贴。虽然价格上涨产生了通胀影响，但这确实是正确之举。通过针对性不强的补贴来帮助穷人，是印尼与印度另一个相同的政策错误。

Indonesia’s growth, which has dropped below 6 per cent, has not fallen as far as India’s. Its people are already more than twice as well off, with nominal gross domestic product per capita of $3,900 against $1,500. Still, like India, Indonesia has rested on its laurels when it should have been advancing. Unless it can gain a new sense of urgency, in the long run its inaction will prove costly.

印尼的增长率已经下降到6%以下，跌幅比印度小一点。印尼的人均收入已经达到印度的两倍多，人均名义国内生产总值(GDP)达到3900美元，而印度为1500美元。然而，就像印度一样，印尼在应该前进的时候陶醉于已经取得的成就。如果它不能够产生一种新的紧迫感，长期来看这种不作为将带来巨大的代价。