朝鲜在制定一个足以打赢美国的核计划

WASHINGTON — Under traditional understandings of North Korea, the country’s test launch of two medium-range ballistic missiles in late June should not have happened. Neither should its failed launch, on Saturday, of a submarine-based missile.

华盛顿——按照对朝鲜的传统理解，在6月末试射两枚中程弹道导弹的事情本不应发生，周六发射潜射导弹一事也一样，虽然后者失败了。

But they did. And that has brought new urgency to a growing conversation among many North Korea watchers: Is our understanding of this country fundamentally wrong?

但的确发生了。这让很多朝鲜问题观察人士之间日渐增多的讨论变得更加紧迫：我们对这个国家的了解从根本上就是错的吗？

The country’s weapons programs have long been understood as meant not for immediate military purposes, but to rally North Koreans behind the leadership and extract concessions from foreign governments. North Korea’s bluster, in this view, is not sincere, but just another set piece in an elaborate, never-ending show.

外界长期认为，该国的武器计划不是出于直接的军事目的，而是为了将朝鲜民众团结在领导人背后，并设法让外国政府让步。从这个观点出发，朝鲜的叫嚣并不是真的，只是其精心策划、无休无止的表演中的一部分。

This does not, however, adequately explain North Korea’s recent flurry of weapons tests, often using unproven technology that tends to fail many times, bringing embarrassment to a government that prefers to project confidence, and that incurs heavy diplomatic and financial tolls the country cannot afford.

然而，这不足以解释朝鲜近期一连串的武器试验。这些测试使用的通常是未经验证的技术，往往会多次失败，让一个更愿意展现自信的政府处境尴尬，并给它带来不可承受的外交和经济损失。

Such tests, according to a growing chorus of experts, suggest that North Korea is now seeking, in a more focused and determined way, a real, functioning nuclear weapons program — and could be on the way to getting it.

专家日渐一致地认为，这类试验表明朝鲜目前正在以一种更专注、更坚定的方式，寻求一个真正的、能正常运转的核武器计划，并且这个目标可能即将实现。

“The conventional wisdom treats these tests and strategic programs as political tools,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “They’re more than that.”

“传统观点认为这些试验和战略计划是政治工具，”国际战略研究所(International Institute for Strategic Studies)的学者马克·菲茨帕特里克(Mark Fitzpatrick)说。“实际上它们不仅限于此。”

This realization is forcing analysts to rethink not just nuclear issues, but also the underlying goals and motivations of the North Korean state itself, with sweeping implications for how one of the world’s most secretive nations is understood.

这种认识正在迫使分析人士重新思考核问题，以及朝鲜这个国家本身的根本目的和动机，从而广泛地影响到外界如何看待这个堪称全世界最神秘的国家。

A sudden change in 2014

2014年的突然转变

North Korea has had only three leaders, each of whom has faced the same problem: governing a small country with few resources, outnumbered by powerful enemies.

朝鲜迄今只出现了三位领导人，三人都面临同一个问题：统治一个几乎没有什么资源、却有着众多强大敌人的小国。

Kim Il Sung, the nation’s founding leader, used diplomacy. By allying with the Soviet Union and China — and playing the two off each other — he secured protection and support.

朝鲜的开国领袖金日成(Kim Il Sung)利用的是外交手段。通过与苏联和中国结盟——并利用两国之间的纷争——他获得了保护和支持。

His son Kim Jong Il came to power in the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed and China’s interest in backing a rogue nation waned. In response, he put the country on a permanent war footing. Kim Jong Il began developing missiles and nuclear weapons, periodically stirring up geopolitical crises that promoted nationalism at home and won international concessions abroad.

其子金正日(Kim Jong Il)在90年代初上台。当时，苏联垮台，中国对支持一个流氓国家的兴趣逐渐减少。鉴于此，他让朝鲜走上了永久性的备战道路。金正日开始发展导弹和核武器，不时挑起地缘政治危机。这些危机在朝鲜国内促进了民族主义，在国外赢取了各国的让步。

Foreign governments and analysts concluded that these programs, which North Korea tested erratically but with great fanfare, were meant primarily for political rather than military ends. The country’s leadership was seen as reactive and focused on preserving the status quo. State propaganda, warning endlessly of war with South Korea and the United States, was dismissed as merely a tool for internal control.

外国政府和分析人士的结论曾是，针对这些计划，朝鲜之所以时不时大张旗鼓地展开试验，主要是出于政治目的而非军事目的。该国领导人被认为处于被动地位，重点在保持现状上。官方的宣传没完没了地警告说要与韩国和美国开战，但外界对其不予考虑，认为这只是实现内部控制的伎俩。

That view has held for 20 years, through Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011 and the ascension of his son Kim Jong Un.

这种观点持续了20年。在这期间，金正日于2011年去世，其子金正恩(Kim Jong Un)上台。

But, three years into the younger Kim’s reign, as he carried out a series of high-level political purges, something seemed to shift.

但在金正恩执政三年过后，随着他在高层中进行一系列的清洗，情况似乎变了。

“In 2014, they started testing things like crazy,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California. The country also built a new underground nuclear testing facility.

“2014年，他们开始像疯了一样进行试验，”加州明德大学蒙特雷国际研究学院(Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey)的核武器专家杰弗里·刘易斯(Jeffrey Lewis)说。朝鲜还新建了一处地下核试验场。

Because most of the tests failed — and because of popular depictions of the country as silly and backward — they were shrugged off as farce. It was “easy to kind of laugh at them,” Lewis said.

因为大部分试验失败了——也因为流行将该国描述成愚蠢和落后的样子——外界满不在乎，认为它们纯属闹剧。刘易斯说，“外界很容易去嘲笑贬损他们。”

Now, in retrospect, it seems that the tests indicated a change whose ramifications are only beginning to become clear to analysts.

现在回过头去看，那些试验似乎表明了一种变化。在分析人士看来，这种变化的后果才刚开始变得清晰起来。

Targeting the United States

瞄准美国

Andrea Berger, a proliferation expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that for years she and some of her colleagues believed “that one of the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear development was to eventually sell it for the right price,” either in part or in full. Others, of course, thought North Korea was simply engaging in a game of cat and mouse, agreeing to freeze parts of the program in exchange for cash or food, only to unfreeze them later in hopes of making another deal on the same goods in another round of negotiations.

伦敦皇家联合军种国防研究所(Royal United Services Institute)研究武器扩散问题的专家安德丽亚·伯格(Andrea Berger)说，多年来，她和一些同事一直认为，“朝鲜发展核武器背后的动机之一是最终卖个好价钱”，要么是卖一部分，要么是全部。当然，其他人则认为朝鲜只是在玩一个猫捉老鼠的游戏，同意冻结部分计划以换取现金或粮食，结果后来又将其解冻，希望凭借同样的东西在下一轮谈判中再达成一笔交易。

In any case, Berger said the country’s activity since 2014 had led to “growing sentiment, and I would go so far as to say it is now the majority view, that North Korea may not be willing to give up its nuclear program or missile programs at all.”

伯格认为，无论如何，该国自2014年以来的活动都让“人们越来越觉得，朝鲜可能根本不愿意放弃其核计划和导弹计划。我甚至可以说，现在这已经是多数派的观点了。”

The medium-range missile North Korea tested in late June, known as a Musudan, had failed in all five of its prior launches. Last month’s launch, while not a categorical success, showed progress — one of many hard-won breakthroughs.

朝鲜6月下旬进行了“舞水端”中程导弹测试。前五次测试均以失败告终，不过6月这次测试虽不是彻底的成功，却已经有所进步——这是诸多得来不易的突破之一。

“We are coming to the realization that North Korea is filling some of the technological gaps we thought they had and erasing some of the question marks quicker than we are comfortable with,” Berger said.

“我们逐渐认识到，朝鲜正在缩小一些我们认为的技术差距，他们进步的速度也快到让我们不安，”伯格说。

North Korea appears focused on acquiring key nuclear capabilities, including, Berger said, “a demonstrated ability to strike the continental United States.”

朝鲜似乎侧重在获取一些关键的核能力上，包括伯格所说的，“证明他们有能力袭击美国本土。”

John Schilling, who tracks North Korea’s weapons programs at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, has concluded that within the next decade, North Korea will probably produce a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach parts of the West Coast of the United States.

约翰·霍普金斯大学美韩研究所(U.S.- Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University)研究朝鲜武器计划的专家约翰·席林(John Schilling)认为，在下个十年内，朝鲜研制的搭载核弹头的洲际弹道导弹很可能就可以覆盖到美国西海岸的部分地区。

The country is also developing multiple ways to deliver these missiles, as indicated by Saturday’s submarine test-launch.

该国还在开发多种用来发射这些导弹的方式，周六的潜射试验就是一个证据。

An extreme solution

极端的解决方案

As analysts adjust their view of North Korea’s intentions, they are grappling with a much bigger question: Why is North Korea so bent on a program that brings economic sanctions, the risk of conflict and isolation even from China, its sole remaining ally and benefactor?

分析人士在调整他们对朝鲜意图的看法，他们也随之面临一个大得多的问题：为什么朝鲜如此坚决地开展这个计划，不怕经济制裁，不惜冒着和中国发生冲突，甚至断交的风险呢？中国是朝鲜仅剩的盟友，为其提供援助。

Put another way: What does North Korea believe it will gain from nuclear weapons that is worth these costs?

换一种说法：朝鲜为什么觉得拥有核武器值得付出这么大的代价呢？

Experts have not settled on a consensus answer, but offer a range of possible explanations. What these theories share is a sense that North Korea’s leadership believes it is facing a potentially existential crisis and is willing to take extreme steps to survive.

对于这个问题，专家莫衷一是，但他们提供了一系列可能的解释。这些解释的共通点在于，朝鲜领导层认为该国面临着潜在的生存危机，因此不惜采取极端措施来求取生机。

Some analysts say the North Korean warnings of a looming conflict with the United States and South Korea might not just be for show, but rather indicate that the country’s leaders earnestly believe war could be coming.

一些分析人士表示，朝鲜此前警告美国和韩国即将与之发生冲突，或许不只是说说而已，而是表明该国领导层真的认为战争有可能到来。

In this view, the country would need more than just a single bomb to deter its enemies. It would require a nuclear program large enough to make such a war winnable.

依照这种观点，朝鲜要威慑敌人，将需要不止一枚炸弹。它需要一个大到足以赢得这场战争的核计划。

Details about North Korea’s advances suggest the outlines of a war plan, Lewis said. The country seems to be building the capability to launch rapid nuclear strikes against nearby military targets, such as U.S. military bases on Guam and the Japanese island of Okinawa, as well as South Korean ports where any U.S. invasion force would land.

刘易斯表示，有关朝鲜取得进步的细节显示出一个战争计划的轮廓。朝鲜似乎在打造能对附近军事目标进行快速核打击的能力，比如美国在关岛和日本冲绳岛的军事基地，以及美国部队一旦出兵将要借以登陆的韩国港口。

“I think their hope is that the shock of that will cause us to stop,” Lewis said. “Then the whole point of the ICBMs is that there is something in reserve” to threaten West Coast U.S. cities, in theory forcing the United States to stand down.

“我认为，他们的希望是由此带来的冲击会让我们停止行动，”刘易斯说。“那么洲际弹道导弹的全部意义就在于，朝鲜有东西可以”威胁美国西海岸城市的安全，在理论上迫使美国做出退让。

Fitzpatrick argued that even if North Korea does not intend to carry out such a plan, it hopes that raising concerns of a nuclear conflict will “drive a wedge between the United States and its allies,” particularly South Korea.

菲茨帕特里克则认为，就算朝鲜无意实施这一计划，它也希望对可能发生核冲突日渐增长的担忧可以“在美国及其盟友之间制造隔阂”，尤其是与韩国。

Should North Korea acquire a nuclear-capable missile that could hit Washington state, some Americans might well question the value of continuing to guarantee South Korea’s security.

倘若朝鲜研制出可以发射至华盛顿州的可携带核弹头的导弹，一些美国人可能也会对美国持续保障韩国安全的价值提出质疑。

“The North Koreans would like people to doubt that the United States would trade Seattle for Seoul,” Fitzpatrick said, referring to a Cold War adage that the United States accepted risks to its own cities so as to defend those of its allies.

“朝鲜乐见有人怀疑美国不应拿西雅图换首尔，”菲茨帕特里克说。这里借用了冷战中的一句话，意为美国让本国城市蒙受风险，以维护盟国的安全。

B.R. Myers, a North Korea scholar at Dongseo University in South Korea, takes this theory one step further. The nuclear program, he believes, is meant not only to scare off the United States, but to one day coerce the South into accepting the North’s long-stated demand: reunification on its own terms.

在韩国东西大学(Dongseo University)研究朝鲜问题的学者B·R·迈尔斯(B.R. Myers)将这一理论做了进一步的发挥。他认为，朝鲜实施核计划不只是为威慑美国，也是为了有朝一日能迫使韩国接受朝鲜长期以来的要求：按照它的条件实现统一。

“It is the only goal big enough to make sense of a nuclear program that has made the DPRK less secure than it was 10 years ago,” Myers said, using the abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name.

“只有这么大的目标才说得通，才足以让人理解为何朝鲜民主主义人民共和国要实施一个让自身比10年前更加不安全的核计划，”迈尔斯说。